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AbstractThis work presents a novel technique for joint
secured and robust transmission of orthogonal frequency divi-
sion multiplexing (OFDM) based communication systems. The
proposed system is implemented by developing a new OFDM
symbol structure based on symmetric key cryptography. At
the receiver side, data detection becomes infeasible without the
knowledge of the secret key. For an intruder who tries to detect
the data without the knowledge of the key, the signal will be a
noise-like signal. In addition to the system security, theoretical
and simulation results demonstrated that the proposed system
provides time and frequency diversity, which makes the system
highly robust against severe frequency-selective fading as well as
other impairments such as impulsive noise and multiple access
interference. For particular frequency-selective fading channels,
the bit error rate (BER) improvements was about 15 dB at
10 4.
Index TermsOFDM, security, encryption, physical layer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although OFDM is highly robust against various trans-
mission impairments, it does not have any inherent security
features. Hence, additional encryption/decryption algorithms
should be implemented to grant data security. Generally
speaking, most data security algorithms are implemented in
the higher layers of the OSI model. For example, the WEP
protocol is integrated as a part of the data-link layer (layer
2), the IPSec is part of the network layer (layer 3), and
most widely used block and stream ciphers are implemented
in layers 5, 6 and 7 [1], [2]. The main limitation of such
commonly designed ciphers is their low speed, which is a
major drawback for todays broadband systems. Consequently,
substantial research efforts were recently steered towards
physical-layer security (PLS) algorithms, several examples for
PLS systems can be found in [3], [4] and the references listed
therein.
Generally speaking, most PLS-OFDM cryptosystems are
designed to function at the bit or symbol level. For example,
Dzung [5] developed a system which encrypts the baseband
QAM symbols by changing their phase according to a given
key sequence before the Inverse Fast Fourier transform (IFFT)
process. Moreover, the training symbols that are embedded
for synchronization and channel estimation are encrypted as
well. Consequently, the encryption process hides the neces-
sary information required for synchronization and channel
estimation, which are necessary to recover the encrypted
data symbols. Furthermore, the data symbols themselves are
encrypted as well. Moffatt [6]-[7] developed a security system
for OFDM by mixing the phases of the data symbols and
varying the data-to-subcarrier assignment based on a secret
key sequence. Therefore, an eavesdropper needs rst to know
the mapping between data and subcarriers, and then the
phase/amplitude of the data symbols. Similar to the above
mentioned systems, there are several other systems based on
the general concept of building an encryption technique by
processing the frequency domain symbols [8], [9]-[11].
In this work we exploit the OFDM unique structure to
develop a secured communication system that relies on the
sensitivity of OFDM systems to synchronization errors [12],
[13]. At the transmitter side, the encryption is performed by
hiding some necessary synchronization information based on
a secrete key sequence. At the receiver side, the decryption
would be impossible without the knowledge of the correct
synchronization parameters. For an attacker who does not
have the correct key, the received signal will be a noise-like
signal. Unlike most PLS-OFDM systems, the proposed system
utilizes the time-domain samples post the IFFT. Consequently,
the new system will have strong security as well as low
computational complexity. Furthermore, the proposed system
has high immunity against multipath fading, jamming and
impulsive noise due to the time and frequency diversity
inherent to this system.
In what follows unless otherwise specied, uppercase bold-
face and blackboard letters such as H and H will denote
× matrices, whereas lowercase boldface letters such
as x will denote row or column vectors with elements.
Bold upper and lowercase letters with a tilde such as H and
r will denote × matrices and row/column vectors with
elements, respectively. Symbols with a hat such as  will
denote the estimate of . Encrypted vectors will be enclosed
in angle brackets such as hxi
II. OFDM SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In OFDM, the data sequence d = [ 0 1 1] is
used to modulate orthogonal subcarriers during the th
OFDM symbol, = 0 1. In general, the elements of
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2d are complex symbols drawn uniformly from a quadrature
amplitude modulation (QAM) constellations. The modulation
process can be implemented efciently by applying d to an
-points IFFT process to produce the time-domain sequence
x, x = [ 0 1 1] ,
x( )= F d( ) (1)
where the IFFT matrix F is the Hermitian transpose of
the normalized × FFT matrix. The elements of F
can be expressed as = E , E , exp( 2 ),
{ } 0,1, , 1. Therefore, the th sample of x( )
can be expressed as,
( ) =
1
1X
=0
( )E = 0 1 1. (2)
Assuming that the CP consists of samples, the transmit-
ted th OFDM block will be composed of = +
samples with the following frame structure,
x = [ , , 1, 0 , 1] . (3)
After dropping the samples, the received sequence y =
[ 0, 1, , 1] is obtained,
y( ) = H( )x( ) + z( ) (4)
The system noise z = [ 0 1 1] is modeled as a
white Gaussian process with zero mean and variance 2 =
[| |2], H denotes the channel matrix during the th OFDM
block. Assuming that the channel remains xed for one
OFDM symbol period, the matrix H can be expressed as
H =
0 1 · · · 1
1 0
. . .
...
...
...
. . . 1
1 2 · · · 0
(5)
The discrete-time channel impulse response samples = 0
where is the channel order and .
Since H is a circulant matrix, hence it can be diagonalized by
the IFFT/FFT matrices, i.e., FHF =H where H is ×
diagonal matrix whose th diagonal element can be expressed
as,
( ) =
1X
=0
( )E ( +1). (6)
Therefore, the received samples can be written as
y( ) = F H( )d( ) + z( ) (7)
where the th element of y can be expressed as
( ) = 1
1X
=0
( ) ( )E + ( ). (8)
The time-domain samples are then applied to the FFT to
produce the decision variables that will be used to reproduce
the transmitted symbols, Y( ) = Fy( ), where
( ) = ( ) ( ) + ( ) (9)
where = 1
P 1
=0 E is a Gaussian random vari-
able with the same statistical properties as .
III. THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
As it can be noted from (4), each sample is formed
by mixing all data symbols 0 1 using the IFFT. To
recover the data symbols, all the time-domain samples { ,
= 0 · · · 1} should be available at the receiver.
Hiding the original values of or loosing part of them will
destroy the subcarriers orthogonality and hence inter-carrier
interference (ICI) and inter-symbol interference (ISI) will be
introduced, which might lead to high bit error rate (BER).
Consequently, if a particular function F is used to hide the
original values of , it will be difcult to recover the data
symbols without errors if F is not inverted at the receiver
side. Therefore, if F is chosen such that it cannot be guessed
by the attackers, and the information loss due to the absence of
information about F is maximized, the data sequence d can be
considered to be secured. However, the samples are analog,
1
2 | | 12 , hence one-way functions based on
discrete mathematics, which are used in conventional security
systems may not be suitable for this system. Moreover, the
function F should be selected such that the average signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) at the receiver side does not degrade
when the inverse function F 1 is applied, i.e., the encryption-
decryption processes should be distortionless. Inspired by our
previous work on OFDM synchronization [12]-[13], we notice
that ICI and ISI cannot be avoided unless the samples
belong to the same OFDM symbol , {0 1 1},
and all samples are placed in the right order, i.e., 0, 1, ,
1.
Obviously, the ICI/ISI power is proportional to the number
of samples included from other OFDM blocks, and/or the
number of out of order samples [13]. For a perfect channel
( 2 = 0 and H = I) where the -samples block comprises
samples from other OFDM blocks or out of order samples,
the FFT output can be expressed as
( ) = ( ) ( ) + ( ) (10)
where is an attenuation factor and is the interference.
Both and depend on the number of samples that belong
to the th OFDM symbol, and how many samples are in
correct order. Consequently, the useful data symbols at the
output of the FFT will be signicantly attenuated and heavily
buried in interference. Therefore, we can propose to secure the
transmitted data by either reordering the time-domain samples
( ), mixing the samples of different OFDM symbols, or
both mixing and reordering the samples of OFDM symbols.
One simple approach to change the order of samples and
to mix them with the samples of other OFDM blocks is to
use permutation matrices, which can be realized as a random
block or convolutional interleaver. Therefore, we assume that
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3before transmission, an × time-domain samples that
corresponds to OFDM symbols collected at the IFFT
output are permuted according to an × pseudorandom
permutation matrix P. Therefore, the encrypted time-domain
samples can be expressed as
hX( )i=F (x(1) x( ) P( )) (11)
= P( )[x(1) x( )] (12)
where is the encrypted block index, P is a permutation
matrix that consists of ones and ( 1) zeros, and
the ones are distributed such that no row or column has
more than a single one. Subsequently, the samples are
fragmented into blocks each of which consists of samples,
and the rest of the transmission process is identical to the
standard OFDM. Therefore, the received signal after removing
the CP samples is given by
hy( )i = H( ) hx( )i+ z( ) (13)
It can be noted from (13) that the channel matrix should be
estimated and compensated before eliminating the permuta-
tion process effect. Consequently, the received samples after
compensating the channel matrix can be expressed as,
r( )=H 1( ) hy( )i+ ( ) (14)
where ( ) = H 1( )z( ). Although the equalization process
seems to require time-domain equalization, frequency domain
equalization can be applied as well, as described in Section
V. Once the channel effects are compensated for received
OFDM symbols, the vector ( ) = [r(1) r( )] is then
de-permuted using P 1( )
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Security analysis for such a system can be expressed in
terms of the probability of estimating the matrix P, and
by measuring the information loss due to the inaccurate
knowledge of P. In this work we consider the chosen plain-
text attack since it is usually considered as one of the strongest
measures for security assessment. This type of attacks is based
on the assumption that the attacker can choose arbitrary pairs
of plain-text and its corresponding cipher-text. In other words,
the attacker can decide what is the value of d, and knows y( )
perfectly. To simplify the discussion, we consider rst the case
of perfect channel where H = I and z = 0. Moreover, the
permutation matrix P is selected to permute only samples.
the received sequence (13) can be expressed as
hy( )i = P( )x( ) = P( )F d( ) (15)
Since it was assumed that the data symbols are known, a
possible approach to nd P can be achieved by noting that
the th element of the right-hand side of (15) can be expressed
as
h ( )i =
1X
=0
( ) ( ), 0, · · · , 1 (16)
However, since {0 1}, and only one out of the
elements in the th row of P is not zero. Thus (16) can be
simplied to
h ( )i = ( ) ( ), 0, · · · , 1. (17)
Hence ( ) = 1 and ( ) = 0 6= .
However, at the physical layer there are various impair-
ments that affect the cipher-text hy( )i such as the AWGN. In
such a case, the th sample of the cipher-text can be written
as
h ( )i =
1X
=0
( ) ( ) + . (18)
This case is more involved due to the noise impact on the
cipher-text. However if the matrix P is xed for large number
of symbols, the attacker can repeat the transmission and
reception of y for times to eliminate the AWGN,
lim
À1
h ( )i = ( ) ( ) + 1
1X
=0
( ) ( ) ( ).
(19)
Hence, the matrix P in the presence of noise can be found
following the same approach used for the noiseless case,
except for the additional averaging. Consequently, a neces-
sary condition for the security of this approach is to make
P( ) P( ) 6= , [ ] {1 2 }, where
denotes the statistical independence. This goal can be achieved
by generating P in a pseudo random fashion based on the
encryption key.
Under the assumption that the permutation matrices are
independent, the minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) esti-
mation can be used to estimate P,
P( ) = arg min
P ( )
|hy( )i P ( )x( )|2 , = 0 1 ! 1
(20)
As it can be noted from (20), nding the matrixP using brute-
force approach is quite costly even for the simple ×
permutation matrix because such process requires ! for the
× P matrix, and ! trials for the × P matrix.
For certain OFDM applications where 256, we can set
= 1 because 256! 21683. Thus, it is computationally
infeasible to break this system by exhaustive search techniques
to nd P even for small size permutation matrices. Another
possible approach to enhance the security of the proposed
system is to invoke nonlinear F functions. However, the
impact of such functions on the SNR should be investigated
carefully.
V. BER PERFORMANCE IN FADING CHANNELS
Generally speaking, it is infeasible to deduce a general
BER solution for all values of and P. However, extensive
simulation results demonstrated that the performance is almost
identical for 5 regardless of the matrix P. Moreover,
selecting the matrix P randomly can lead to substantially
complicated analysis. Consequently, we choose a special P
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4matrix to facilitate the analysis, extending the analysis to
different P matrices can be achieved by following the same
approach used for this matrix.
Consider the case of 2 × 2 P matrix that is designed
so that the rst transmitted samples are the rst samples
of the buffered OFDM blocks, the second transmitted
samples are the second samples of the buffered OFDM
blocks, etc. Therefore, the transmitted sequence of symbols
can be expressed as hx(0)i, hx(1)i, , hx( 1)i where
hx( )i = £ (0) (1) · · · ( 1) ¤ (21)
The samples of the CP is formed by copying the last
samples of hxi and appending them at the front of hxi
to compose the transmission symbol. Consequently, the th
transmitted sample is given by
h ( )i = h ([ ] )i , = 0 1 1 (22)
where [ ] , mod . The sequence hxi is upsampled, ltered
and up-converted to a radio frequency centered at before
transmission through the antenna.
At the receiver front-end, the received signal is down-
converted to baseband and sampled at a rate = .
In this work we assume that the channel is composed of
+1 independent multipath components each of which has
a gain and delay × , where {0, 1, , }.
The channel taps are assumed to be constant over OFDM
symbols, which corresponds to a static multipath channel. The
received sequence hyi consists of samples, and it can be
expressed as
hy( )i=H( ) hx( )i+z( ), (23)
where the channel matrix H is an × Toeplitz matrix
with 0 on the principal diagonal and 1, , on the minor
diagonals, respectively. Given that + 1 , The th
sample of hy( )i is given by
h i =
1X
=0
[ ]
®
, 0 1 (24)
Subsequently, the receiver should identify and extract the se-
quence hyi = h[ ,  +1  + 1]i and discard
the CP samples h[0, 1  1]i. Therefore,
h i =
1X
=0
[ + ]
®
, 0 1 (25)
In vector notation, the sequence hyi can be expressed as,
hyi = H hxi+z. (26)
By noting that H = F HF, where
H = diag ([ 0, 1, · · · , 1]) , =
X
=0
2
,
then (26) can be written as
hyi = F HF hxi+z. (27)
To extract hxi from hyi we multiply by the FFT matrix, the
inverse of the channel matrix and the IFFT matrix. Therefore,
the equalizer output is computed as
hsi = F H 1F hyi = hxi+F H 1F| {z }
V
z (28)
Once again, using the fact that H = F HF we conclude
that the matrix V is circulant where the rst row is given by
(0 :) =
1 1P
=0
1
1P
=0
E · · ·
1P
=0
E ( 1)
¸
(29)
It is interesting to note from (29) that each element in V is
composed of a mixture of all elements ofH 1. Consequently,
Vz , can be written as
=
1
P 1
=0
P 1
=0 EP 1
=0
P 1
=0 E [ 1+ ]P 1
=0
P 1
=0 E [ 2+ ]
...P 1
=0
P 1
=0 E [ +1]
(30)
The decryption process starts by buffering OFDM symbols,
and then multiplying them by P 1. The output depends on
the transmitted symbol number and can be expressed as,
s( )= x( )+ h ( )i = F d( )+ h ( )i (31)
where
h ( )i = 1
1P
=0
1P
=0
(0)
(0)E [ + ]
1P
=0
1P
=0
(1)
(1)E [ + ]
...
1P
=0
1P
=0
( 1)
( 1)E [ + ]
Applying the FFT to extract the data gives
d ( ) = F
¡
F d( )+ h ( )i¢
= d( ) +F h ( )i (32)
where, for example, h (0)i , F h (0)i can be written as
h (0)i = 13
2
1P
c1=0
( )
( )E ,
1P
c1=0
( )
( )E ( ),
· · · ,
1P
c1=0
( )
( )E (
2)
(33)
and where
1P
c1=0
,
P 1
=0
P 1
=0
P 1
=0 . Hence, while the
equalized FFT output of a standard OFDM are given by
0 = 0 +
1
0
1X
=0
(34)
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5for the TDI it is given by,
0 = 0 + h 0i (35)
= 0 +
1
3
2
1X
=0
1X
=0
( )
1X
=0
E
( )
(36)
It can be noted from (36) that the decryption process and
the last FFT operations have mixed the channel frequency
response parameters of the entire interleaving block length.
Moreover, since we assumed that the channel is static, then
( ) = , thus
0 = 0 +
1
3
2
1X
=0
1X
=0
( )
1X
=0
E
(37)
The SNR for a given channel matrix H can be expressed as
SNR |H =
2
1
3
(¯¯¯¯
1P
c1=0
( )E
¯¯¯¯2) (38)
where 2 =
n
| 0|2
o
. The {·} in the denominator of (38)
can be expanded to
1X
c2=0
E E ©
( ) ( )
ª
(39)
where
P 1
c2=0
,P 1=0 P 1=0 P 1=0 P 1=0 P 1=0 P 1=0 .
For = , = (39) can be reduced to
2
1X
=0
1X
=0
1X
=0
E ( )
(40)
Moreover, since
1X
=0
E ( )
= 0, for 6= , (41)
thus;
1X
=0
1X
=0
1X
=0
E ( )
= 0 for 6= (42)
Therefore,
1X
c2=0
E E ©
( ) ( )
ª
=
2 2
1P
=0
1
| |2 ,
=
=
=
0,
(43)
Finally, the conditional SNR can be expressed as
SNR |H = snr1 P 1
=0
1
| |2
(44)
where snr = 2 2 . As it can be noted from (44), the SNRs
across all subcarriers are equal, which implies that this system
has introduced frequency diversity to the OFDM system.
However, if any of the subcarriers fades substantially, then
for that subcarrier could be very close to zero. Consequently,
the SNR for that subcarrier as well as all subcarriers will be
close to zero. Therefore, this approach would be useful in mild
frequency-selective channels. To remedy this problem several
solutions can be adopted such as discarding the subcarriers
with low values before the last FFT operation, add a xed
bias to the subcarriers in deep fade, or use the minimum mean
squared error (MMSE) equalizer. Once the division by zero
problem is solved, the system will experience a remarkable
BER improvement over frequency-selective channels. The
SNR |H using other equalization techniques can be derived
similar to the ZF approach. However, due to space limitation
we present only the Monte Carlo simulation results.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To demonstrate the security strength of the proposed ap-
proach, a general OFDM system is simulated over AWGN
channel with a small × P matrix, which corresponds
to the shortest block length of = 1. The number of
subcarriers = 256, the data symbols are selected from a
QAM constellations with 4, 16, and 64 levels, the SNR is set
to 30 dB. The number of samples mixed K varies from 0 to
256. As depicted in Fig. 1, even if the attacker knows up 200
values of the correct order, it is still very difcult to get any
reliable data as the SER is more than 90% for most QAM
values. It is worth noting that the upper limit for the SER is
equal to (1 1 ), in such a case the receiver is just selecting
any of the possible symbols randomly. The results of Fig.
1 show that this bound is almost achieved for 4 given
that K & 50.
The BER performance in frequency-selective fading chan-
nels is depicted in Fig. 2. The adopted channel model
corresponds to a moderate frequency-selective channel that
consists of ve multipath components with normalized delays
of [0 1 2 6 11] samples and gains of [0 34, 0 28, 0 23, 0 11,
0 04]. The mean-squared delay spread of the channel is equal
to 6 37 and the multipath components powers are modeled as
independent Rayleigh random numbers. The channel param-
eters remain constant over one block of OFDM symbols,
which corresponds to a static channel that is widely used to
model powerline and broadcasting channels.
Fig. 2 presents the BER of the proposed and standard
OFDM systems. The ZF results are obtained semi analytically
using (44) and conrmed using Monte Carlo simulation, the
MMSE BER results is obtained using simulation. As it can
be noted from this gure, the improvement achieved using the
ZF equalizer is very limited while a remarkable improvement
of more than 15 dB is achieved using the proposed system
with MMSE.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work presented a novel physical layer security tech-
nique for OFDM based communication systems. The proposed
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
Fig. 1. Example-I, the SER using 64, 32, 16 and 4 QAM constellations for
different values of K = 1, out of order samples.
        

−6
−5

−4
−3
−2
−1






Fig. 2. The BER of the proposed system using ZF and MMSE equalizers
in frequency-selective fading channels.
system is based on using a permutation matrix of particular
size to reorder the K OFDM samples in a random manner.
Simulation results demonstrated that the system is highly
immune against the chosen cipher-text attack as long as the
permutation matrix changes pseudorandomly each transmis-
sion block. This requirement is not essential for other simpler
attacks such as the chosen ciphertext attack. In addition
to the security features of the proposed system, analytical
and simulation results demonstrated that a signicant BER
improvement of more than 15 dB is achieved using the MMSE
equalizer as compared to the standard OFDM.
Our future work will focus on evaluating the performance
of the proposed system using nonlinear functions and using
different combining matrices. Moreover, the derivation of
analytical or semi analytical BER using the MMSE and
equalization methods will be considered as well.
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